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“The purpois is honorabill, and
may conduce to the good of our service”:
Lord Ochiltree and the Cape Breton Colony, 1629-1631
It has become common in recent studies of the origins of the British empire to
downplay the importance of direct Crown support for colonial initiatives in North
America, especially in the early decades of the 17th century. As John C. Appleby
observes in the first volume of the Oxford History of the British Empire, “small,
incomplete, and potentially chaotic societies were of slight concern to the state:
colonies, like trade, aroused little interest unless they could be taxed or exploited for
other financial purposes. In the long term, this lack of political interest or control was
to be fatal to English interests in America. In the short term, it created a patchwork of
small settlements and trading posts, populated by marginal migrants with a tenuous
hold on the land, and with a future as unsettled as it was unclear”.1 While this
characterization cannot be completely refuted, the fact remains that both James VI/I
and Charles I did show timely interest in colonial ventures, sometimes for reasons that
were not exclusively economic in nature nor tied to the futures of marginal migrants.2
This article examines the strategic underpinnings of one such venture: the abortive
colony of Nova Scotia – specifically the settlement established by James Stewart of
Killeith, fourth Lord Ochiltree, on Cape Breton Island in 1629. While that Cape
Breton settlement was ultimately a failed initiative, that fact should not diminish the
priority that Charles I and his governments initially placed upon it and the western
North Atlantic as a component of a wartime strategy. Ochiltree’s Cape Breton colony
represented a key component in an embryonic network of British installations in the
western North Atlantic, something that grew out of the British kingdom’s war with
France in the late 1620s. A new understanding of these details will challenge the
aforementioned tendency to minimise the Crown’s active interest in colonial matters
in the early-17th century.
In order to appreciate the strategic importance that the Cape Breton colony came
to represent and to understand why Charles I leant his active support to it, some
background on Nova Scotia and its original patentee, Sir William Alexander, is
necessary. Notwithstanding the fact that Sir William Alexander’s dreams for the
establishment of a Scottish colony in North America in the 1620s and 1630s went
1 John C. Appleby, “War, Politics, and Colonization, 1558-1625”, in Nicholas Canny, ed., The Origins
of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 2001), pp.
77-8. See also David Loades, England’s Maritime Empire: Seapower, Commerce And Policy 1490-
1690 (Harlow, 2000), p. 139. The author wishes to acknowledge the support of Lawrence Flood, Dean
of Natural and Social Sciences at the State University of New York, College at Buffalo, who helped
in the procurement of many of the microfilmed primary sources used in this paper. Special thanks are
extended to John G. Reid of St. Mary’s University, Halifax, for his comments on various drafts of this
paper and for his ongoing encouragement. Thanks also to three anonymous reviewers for their
suggestions and insights
2 James VI of Scotland ascended to the throne of England in 1603 following the death of the childless
Queen Elizabeth.  He thereafter ruled as James I in England, but is often styled James VI/I in
recognition of his two-kingdom rule.
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largely unfulfilled, both the man and his fledgling colony have long been recognised
for their importance in the wider history of the early British empire.3 From the time
of James VI’s grant to Alexander for the formation of a “New Scotland” in 1621 until
the latter’s death in London in 1640, the court poet turned colonial enthusiast
organised four separate plantation efforts in the New World; despite numerous set-
backs and the related accumulation of immense personal debts, he never abandoned
his hopes for overseas initiatives.4 Along the way he contributed greatly to a
philosophy of colonization that stressed self-sufficiency, cooperation amongst the
peoples of the British kingdoms and the need for socially responsible leadership
overseas.5 That the thrusts of his ideas were accepted at the highest level in British
society can be seen from the fact that James VI/I was willing to introduce a new order
of peerage in 1624 – the Knights-Baronet of Nova Scotia – to help finance and
advance colonization in Nova Scotia.6 Charles I would subsequently ratify his father’s
creation during his own reign, but in 1631 he would order the transfer of Nova
Scotia’s only settlement, Port Royal, to French interests in order to complete the
Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Lay.7 In the final analysis, Alexander’s importance to
early imperial history may be, as John Reid has suggested, that he was “a transitional
figure: more knowledgeable and sophisticated than an earlier generation of colonizers
in North America, but soon overtaken by newer approaches”.8
If Alexander’s importance within the annals of early colonial schemes has been
well established, the same cannot be said for everyone who was associated with his
ventures. A case in point is James Stewart of Killeith, fourth Lord Ochiltree, who was
the leader in 1629 of the short-lived British colony on Cape Breton Island (part of
Alexander’s chartered territory for Nova Scotia). While Ochiltree and his fellow
colonists on Cape Breton are never absent from accounts of Alexander’s transatlantic
efforts, their roles and significance have rarely received comprehensive
consideration.9 However, by fitting Ochiltree into the context of contemporary
politics, networks of royal service and court patronage, crown military objectives in
the North Atlantic theatre, and the known history of early Nova Scotia, it is clear that
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3 H.P. Biggar, The Early Trading Companies of New France (Toronto, 1901); Thomas H. McGrail, Sir
William Alexander, First Earl of Stirling: A Biographical Study (Edinburgh, 1940); D.C. Harvey, “Sir
William Alexander”, Dictionary of Canadian Biography [DCB], vol. I, 1000–1700, pp. 50-4; John G.
Reid, Sir William Alexander and North American Colonization: A Reappraisal (Edinburgh, 1990);
Bruce Lenman, England’s Colonial Wars 1550-1688 (Harlow, Essex, 2001), pp. 175-7.
4 For the etymology of the name “Nova Scotia” and its applications in British imperial circles into the
18th century, see John G. Reid, “The Conquest of ‘Nova Scotia’: Cartographic Imperialism and the
Echoes of a Scottish Past”, in Ned C. Landsman, ed., Nation and Province in the First British Empire:
Scotland and the Americas, 1600-1800 (Lewisburg and London, 2001), pp. 39-59.
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the importance of the man and his colony in early British overseas initiatives deserves
re-evaluation.
In virtually every study dealing with Sir William Alexander and the early history
of Nova Scotia, Lord Ochiltree and the colony that was established on Cape Breton
Island rarely receive more than a few paragraphs of treatment. This is understandable
because, at first glance, their story seems straightforward. In the spring of 1629, Sir
William Alexander’s son, Sir William Alexander junior, led two parties of colonists
out to the New World. One group, evidently an adjunct or cadet colony to Alexander’s
main plantation, was deposited near Port-aux-Baleines on Cape Breton Island in July
of 1629 under Ochiltree’s command. After off-loading this party, Alexander sailed on
and established his own settlement on the Bay of Fundy at the former French
installation of Port Royal. That settlement would face hardships of its own, but would
endure as a colony until Charles I ordered its return to the French in 1631.10
Ochiltree’s settlement did not enjoy such a lengthy history. In September 1629,
just two months after its establishment, it was attacked by a French raiding party,
sacked and its inhabitants marched in chains to the hold of a French ship. While some
of the colonists were eventually deposited in England, Ochiltree and 17 others were
kept as prisoners and incarcerated in Dieppe. While there, Ochiltree faced charges and
testified before the French Admiralty Court before his own extradition to England was
arranged in the late autumn or early winter of 1629-30. After that, he disappears from
most accounts of British overseas ventures, although it is generally noted that he was
arranging to return to the New World when he became embroiled in a court scandal
in the spring of 1631.11 On this occasion, Ochiltree’s misguided charges of treason
against the third Marquis of Hamilton, which spawned the scandal, ended in personal
disaster and gained Ochiltree a lengthy term of imprisonment. He was not released
until 1652, just seven years prior to his death.12
There is little evidence to explain why Ochiltree was in the New World in the first
place or why he faced criminal charges at the hands of his French captors, nor is there
any scholarly consideration of how he might have contributed to the entrenchment of
Nova Scotia or how his own political fall may have influenced the almost
simultaneous decline in Crown interest in the colony. Overall, Lord Ochiltree is a
footnote in the early Nova Scotia story and few scholars have seen it necessary to
portray him as anything other than a subordinate to the Alexanders in their positions
of leadership within the early colony.
In order to challenge this view and to gain a greater understanding of Ochiltree’s
role in British endeavours in North America in the late 1620s and early 1630s, it is
first necessary to understand why he fit the profile desired for the leader of a new
colony and how he came to perform in that function. Like many northern European
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10 The final surrender came in 1632 as part of the completion of the terms of the Treaty of Saint-
Germain-en-Lay. These circumstances are fully explained in Reid, “The Scots Crown and the
Restitution of Port Royal”.
11 Ferguson, “James Stewart of Killeith”, p. 613; George Pratt Insh, Scottish Colonial Schemes, 1620-
1686 (Glasgow, 1922), pp. 104-10.
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colonial leaders of the early-17th century, Ochiltree could boast both long periods of
service to his sovereign and the kinds of connections at court that might yield favours
and assistance.13 In terms of his family history, he had known both tremendous highs
and devastating lows. His father, James Stewart of Bothwellmuir had once served
(under the usurped title Earl of Arran) as James VI’s Lord Chancellor in Scotland.14
Despite his father’s disgrace and fall, Ochiltree eventually managed to carve out a
noteworthy political career for himself in his native kingdom. In 1614, he had served
with and eventually commanded the royal forces suppressing Earl Patrick Stewart’s
revolt in Orkney. From 1614 until 1622, he was the king’s tacksman for Orkney, in
charge of the collection of royal rents, the administration of the king’s laws and the
policing of the waters and fisheries around the northern island.15 He also acted in
important political capacities in the Scottish capital, which included being named one
of the Lords of the Articles (the committee that determined the legislative agenda for
the Scottish parliament) for James’ only return visit to his native kingdom in 1617 and
through serving on the assembly that ratified the Five Articles of Perth (James’
controversial religious reforms for Scotland) in 1618. In 1619 he was made a
commissioner of the peace for Ayrshire and, in 1620, was added to a commission
seeking voluntary contributions from Scotland for the relief of the Palatinate.16
These accomplishments alone might have marked Ochiltree as a useful member of
the social and political elite in Scotland: experienced and able to lead a new colony if
that was what he wished to do. However, unlike most long-time enthusiasts for
overseas adventures, there is no indication in Ochiltree’s personal history prior to
1629 that he desired to go to the New World at all. To be sure, the early 1620s began
to mark a steady decline in his personal fortunes, featuring the loss of his tack for
Orkney, mounting debts and the stain of several political and financial scandals in
Edinburgh. While records for this period of his life are incomplete, there is a strong
suggestion that he fled his creditors in Scotland sometime around 1623 and attempted
to remake his fortune in Ulster.17
In 1625-26 he briefly returned to prominence in spectacular fashion through the
intercession of his friend and patron, Robert Maxwell, first Earl of Nithsdale. At
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Nithsdale’s urging, Ochiltree became part of a circle of court-based Scots in London
who advised the king on matters pertaining to the northern kingdom.18 For several
months he played an important role in formulating and defending Charles’ proposed
changes to Scottish land taxation and legal administration. This was a fleeting brush
with success and influence, however, and within a few months of his arrival at court,
Ochiltree’s reputation as a policy maker and royal spokesman had been seriously
damaged.19 In the wake of his failure to help implement the king’s original
“Revocation” for Scotland, he all but disappeared from public view until his
enlistment to the Nova Scotia settlement scheme in 1629.20
Whatever personal reasons Ochiltree may have had for wishing to join in an
enterprise in the New World, there is no question that his decision to settle in Sir
William Alexander’s chartered lands carried the highest level of official support; in
April 1629, Charles I personally guaranteed a loan of £500 to Ochiltree for the express
purpose of planting a colony on Cape Breton Island.21 On its own, this intervention by
the king on behalf of a would-be colonist stands as the first occasion in which either
James VI/I or Charles I had granted financial concessions to anyone other than
Alexander for the Nova Scotia colony. Ochiltree’s former services to James and
Charles might explain the king’s willingness to offer support if all Ochiltree wished
to do was emigrate; however, this does not explain why he was proposing to found a
new colony on Cape Breton Island or why his party was not being used to strengthen
Alexander junior’s settlement at Port Royal. In the absence of explicit documentary
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18 When James VI of Scotland ascended the English throne as James I in 1603, the Scottish court moved
south and thereafter resided in London. Scotland’s government remained independent, however, and
the early Stuarts essentially ruled it from afar. In this situation, communications between the king, his
advisors at court and the Scottish Privy Council in Edinburgh were crucial. For James VI/I, who left
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Movement (Edinburgh, 1991), pp. 42-64.
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21 Charles I to the Scottish Privy Council, 10 December 1629, in Charles Rogers, ed., The Earl of
Stirling’s Register of Royal Letters Relative to the Affairs of Scotland and Nova Scotia from 1615 to
1635, vol. I (Edinburgh), p. 403.
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evidence, the reasons for this anomaly and the explanation for the origins of the Cape
Breton colony must instead be sought in the previous history of Sir William
Alexander’s unsuccessful efforts to settle Nova Scotia as well as in the commercial
and strategic realities that faced the Stuart monarchy in the late 1620s.
Alexander’s charter for the territories, comprising the modern-day Maritime
Provinces and much of the state of Maine, dated to a grant from James VI/I made in
1621.22 Alexander had long dreamt of a colony that his native kingdom could call its
own, and James proved happy to provide the necessary charters. Sadly for Alexander,
his countrymen had not been as willing or as enthusiastic to embrace overseas
exploits; despite numerous inducements, including the creation of a new level of
peerage for investors in the proposed colony, Nova Scotia languished through the
1620s. Alexander’s first attempt to send a party of settlers to the territory in 1622-23
was unsuccessful and subsequent attempts to plant settlers in 1627 and 1628 had been
equally disappointing.23 By the late 1620s, however, the unfolding of the Thirty Years
War in Europe and the strategic objectives of Charles I’s government made the
handling of transatlantic territories a much greater priority.
Where James VI/I had desired to play the role of peacemaker in Europe and largely
avoided actions that might antagonize any of his European neighbours, particularly
Spain and France, Charles I came to the throne determined (largely under the
influence of the royal favourite, George Villiers, first Duke of Buckingham) to pursue
a more aggressive foreign policy. War was declared on Spain in the autumn of 1625
and, after two years of uneasy alliance, the British kingdoms also went to war against
France in 1627.24 It was partly in an effort to prosecute this phase of the war that
Charles granted letters of marque (licenses) to British merchants to attack enemy
shipping on the high seas as well as title to colonial possessions in the New World.25
In the summer of 1628, a cadre of London-based merchant privateers commanded by
Captain David Kirke and his brothers, acting on behalf of the wine merchant William
Berkeley and his partner Gervaise Kirke (the father of the privateers), bottled up the
St. Lawrence River and nearly forced the surrender of Quebec.26 The Kirkes were so
successful that, upon their return to England in the autumn of 1628, London rang to a
ballad celebrating their exploits and expectations ran high that they would complete
the siege of Quebec the following summer.27
Not everyone at Charles’ court, however, was overjoyed by the news that the
London consortium, known as the Merchant Adventurers of Canada, stood poised to
control the St. Lawrence and France’s most important installation in North America.
Sir William Alexander’s ascent had gone on at court despite James VI/I’s death. In
1626, Charles promoted him to the position of Secretary for Scotland and continued
to offer official support for the settling of Nova Scotia. Alexander now feared that the
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Berkeley-Kirke company was proposing to seize and maintain territories that lay
within his chartered lands for Nova Scotia.28
Charles I rarely receives plaudits for his diplomacy or his abilities to create a
coalition of interests. In the case of the competing parties for Canada and Nova Scotia,
however, he was successful in bringing the Berkeley-Kirke syndicate and Alexander
together. Throughout the autumn of 1628, and into the early winter of 1629, he helped
to transform potential competitors into partners and, in February 1629, a new
incarnation of the Company of Adventurers of Canada was formed. This success
stands as an important though underrated effort on Charles I’s behalf to provide
Crown leadership in directing an overseas venture. Furthermore, given the
nationalities of the principal figures involved, the formation of a company that
featured both English and Scottish interests demonstrates that this king was indeed
eager to see subjects from both of his sovereign kingdoms cooperate in specific
colonial and commercial efforts. Significantly, when the Kirkes made their successful
return to the St. Lawrence and Sir William Alexander junior led out his parties of
colonists to Cape Breton and Acadia in the spring of 1629, they did so as part of an
effort that was “British” in scope and that had carrying the war with France to the
North American theatre as at least one of its goals.29
In order to achieve this wider objective, and to ensure that the new colonies were
successes, it was imperative that they feature leadership from socially prominent men,
who were schooled in the arts of war and experienced agents of their king’s decrees.
James Stewart of Killeith, fourth Lord Ochiltree, fit the profile as a leader for the Cape
Breton colony. As noted, just a few years earlier, while on royal service in Orkney, he
had administered and participated in such activities as coastal patrols, the interdiction
of pirates and the establishment of fortifications. In addition to the experience
Ochiltree brought to the colony, his party featured another seasoned military man, a
Scottish mercenary officer named Constance Ferrar, who was a veteran of the
European wars.30 Equally telling was the fact that Ochiltree’s party carried a sufficient
supply of guns, ammunition and heavier artillery, thus showing that they were
prepared to take an aggressive stance from the time they arrived on Cape Breton
Island.31
Once more, the context of the European war and the geography of the North
Atlantic world must be presented as supporting evidence for this hypothesis. As
Charles I and his advisors worked to bring the Kirke and Alexander interests together
in the winter of 1628-29, they must have realized what such a partnership would
mean. There was every reason to believe that the Kirkes would complete their
operations against Quebec when they returned to the New World that summer, and
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this would mean the French would be swept from the St. Lawrence. Alexander had
already gained the adherence of Claude LaTour, the French licensee in Acadia, and
had cause to expect that the coming summer would finally witness the planting of a
successful colony in his chartered territories.32 But, separated by hundreds of nautical
miles, the English and Scottish partners in the Merchant Adventurers of Canada
would be unable to coordinate their defences and were unlikely to be able to share
intelligence regarding any French activities in their respective areas.
The geographical location of Lord Ochiltree’s colonial settlement, Fort Rosemar,
also points to military considerations. It was near the spot where the French would
ultimately construct the fortress of Louisbourg nearly one hundred years later, and
while it should not be suggested that either Charles I’s government or the Company
of Merchant Adventurers of Canada envisioned anything so imposing in the spring of
1629, several factors speak to its potential strategic importance.33 First of all, a colony
on Cape Breton Island would have created a network of British installations in the
New World, stretching from Newfoundland all the way south to New England.34 From
the materials that the Ochiltree party carried and, as will be seen, from the activities
they engaged in once they were landed on Cape Breton, it was evident that asserting
Charles I’s sovereignty in the adjacent waters was part of their raison d’être. The
documentary evidence that does exist indicates, however, that the decision to put
Ochiltree in charge of a colony on Cape Breton was a late one. His name does not
appear in any known documents connected with either Alexander’s proposals or those
of the Merchant Adventurers of Canada prior to his sailing in May 1629. Indeed, the
only mention of anything that remotely connects Ochiltree with the New World is a
letter from December 1629 noting Charles I’s aforementioned loan guarantee the
previous April for Ochiltree for the purpose of planting just such a colony.35
Another indication of the last-minute nature of Ochiltree’s expedition is its
composition. Richard Guthry, a clergyman who sailed with William Alexander junior
and ultimately settled at Port Royal, recorded that when Ochiltree’s party
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disembarked on Cape Breton Island, “eight households of his company” revealed for
the first time that they were Brownists (separatists from the Church of England) and
that they had no intention of residing with the main body of settlers.36 Guthry’s
memorial records that this revelation was a complete surprise and that the existence
of bitter religious divisions did nothing to strengthen the fledgling colony.37 While it
has been speculated, elsewhere, that the presence of this group foreshadowed a
deliberate policy to settle dissenters in the New World, the evidence instead seems to
point to Ochiltree’s hasty recruitment of colonists in England without considering
their compatibility with his wider objectives.38 Ultimately, this group would not prove
to be fatal to the survival of the colony but their presence, and the surprise they
provided for Ochiltree and Alexander junior once they had crossed the Atlantic,
demonstrates that they were an unknown quantity for the leaders of Nova Scotia when
they embarked on their voyage.
To return to the wider proposition, that Ochiltree’s Cape Breton colony was part of
a coordinated effort to provide defensive security for Britain’s new North American
holdings, some additional contextual information must be presented. With the
formation of the Merchant Adventurers of Canada, which vastly expanded Charles I’s
areas of claimed sovereignty in the New World, and with a state of war with France
still in place, some consideration for the security of these regions had to be made. As
it was, the royal navy and the king’s other military resources were already stretched
to the limit, a situation that had necessitated the employment of privateers like the
Kirkes in the first place. This contingency notwithstanding, the realities of war, the
necessity to try and defend the coasts of the British kingdoms, and the administration
of the early Stuart multiple monarchy had already spawned three high-level proposals
to utilise civilian shipping and material from the three British kingdoms in order to
provide for maritime defences at home. In September 1626 the Duke of Buckingham,
in his capacity as Lord Admiral of the Royal Navy, had issued directives calling on
all English and Irish skippers to license themselves for the purposes of assisting in the
patrol and defence of home waters.39 Similar orders were also issued under the king’s
signature for Scotland so that “all this dominions may be provided and fournished
with sufficient strength both for the defense of themselves and the mutuall assistance
each of other against attempts of any enemie”.40 Then, in early 1627, English
Secretary of State Sir John Coke sent a memorandum to Charles I urging a strict
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coordination of all English, Scottish and Irish military material and personnel,
including shipping, for the duration of the war.41 Finally, the war was already having
ramifications for the settlers and fishermen of Newfoundland, who found themselves
being harried by French privateers in 1628. As Lord Baltimore, the proprietor of the
Ferryland colony, wrote to the Duke of Buckingham in August 1628: “We shall
defende this place as well as wee are able: but for the tyme to come, it much concerns
his Maiesties Service and the good of that Kingdome in my poore Iudgement that two
men of warre at the least mightbe bee Continued all the yeare excepte it bee the winter
tyme, vppon this Coast for preservinge of soe many of his Subiectes being all bread
Seamen and their shipping and goodes”.42
There is good reason to suppose, therefore, that the efforts made to join the Kirke
and Alexander interests together were intended to achieve more than just a
commercial partnership, and that the seemingly random decision to help finance, then
plant, a new colony on Cape Breton Island was part of an emerging strategy for
dealing with the expanded British holdings in North America. If these were to be
retained, there would have to be close cooperation among the British interests in the
New World as the home governments were finding it increasingly difficult to meet
their own defensive needs. The exigencies of war had, however, provided a model for
cooperation that could be implemented across the Atlantic, which included the
ongoing use of civilian forces like privateers.
Consideration of the defensive capabilities of these holdings was especially
imperative in the late winter of 1628 and early spring of 1629 because British
intelligence sources in France confirmed that the Company of One Hundred
Associates was outfitting a flotilla of its own in Dieppe, to be deployed for the relief
of Quebec and to sweep British shipping from the St. Lawrence.43 To fully appreciate
what this meant, it is again necessary to recall how events in Europe existed as a
backdrop to these efforts. The major effort that Charles I’s government made against
France in the European phase of the war had consisted of ongoing attempts to relieve
the Huguenot enclave at La Rochelle. But in October 1628, La Rochelle fell to Louis
XIII’s army and the prospects for any British successes on the continent had dimmed.
Furthermore, the Duke of Buckingham was assassinated in August and this event,
coupled with the ongoing opposition Charles I faced from the English parliament over
the prosecution of the war, caused the king to seek a diplomatic conclusion to the
hostilities with France.44 These negotiations to end the war must be seen as one of
several contingencies being pursued by Charles and his advisors at this juncture, and
from what we have seen there is no reason to believe that their efforts to secure
holdings in the New World were insincere. On 29 April 1629, however,  French and
British representatives reached a peace agreement at Susa and, in technical terms,
hostilities came to an end.
The timing of this agreement was pivotal for events that were about to unfold in
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North America. Knowing that the state of war with the British kingdoms had formally
ceased, Cardinal Richelieu downgraded the fighting capacity of the convoy that was
about to embark for the St. Lawrence. Thus, when Captain Charles Daniel, the
commander of the convoy, left Dieppe, he did so knowing that peace had been
reached and that his objective was to use this knowledge in preventing the Kirkes
from taking Quebec.45 By contrast, word of the peace agreement had not reached
London when the Kirke and Alexander expeditions departed in early May. Therefore,
all the British initiatives that were undertaken in Canada and Acadia that summer
were made under the assumption that a state of war still existed. The confusion that
this caused would ultimately prove to be highly important in the determination of
agreed French and British colonial holdings in North America.
Where Ochiltree’s colony was concerned, an assumption that the war was on, and
that the king’s rights must be asserted and defended, lay at the heart of all
undertakings. This caused the colonists to assume an aggressive stance from the start.
One of the party’s first acts upon arriving in the waters off Cape Breton was to attack
and capture a 60-ton Portuguese barque – they mistakenly believed it was French –
that was found at anchor near the site of their proposed settlement. The ship itself was
dismantled and stripped of its cannon, which were then used as artillery to guard the
colony’s new fortified residence Fort Rosemar.46 Along with constructing this
defensive fortification, Ochiltree and his party showed further signs that their colony
was meant to be something other than an agricultural plantation. Throughout July and
August, Ochiltree supervised patrols of the fishing grounds around Cape Breton
Island and instituted a ten per cent duty on all catches made in the region. If the
skippers of the fishing vessels, of whatever nationality, were unable to produce a
license from Charles I’s government giving them permission to fish in those waters,
Ochiltree confiscated their catches and, in some cases, their boats. That he and his
party possessed sufficient arms and patrol boats of their own to carry out these
operations is additional fodder for the notion that they were to be alert for ongoing
hostilities.47
The fall of Fort Rosemar, and the capture of Ochiltree and his party by Captain
Daniel, shows that the French remained very concerned over the new British presence
on Cape Breton Island. After a difficult Atlantic crossing, Daniel had learned from
French fishermen in Gaspe that Quebec had fallen to the Kirkes and that he would be
unable to make any successful efforts in that direction. News of the presence of
Ochiltree’s party on Cape Breton, however, and complaints over their harassment of
French and other fishing vessels, caused him to make Fort Rosemar and Cape Breton
Island his new objective. On 10 September 1629 he captured the British fortification,
ordered its demolition and marched his prisoners north to Bras d’Or Bay, where they
were forced to construct a new fortification for the French. After leaving behind a
small party to garrison the installation, Daniel set sail for France with his prisoners
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stowed in squalid conditions below decks where many soon succumbed to disease and
death.48
Although Daniel did off-load some of his British prisoners at Falmouth that
autumn, Ochiltree and 17 others were taken on to Dieppe where they became the
responsibility of the French Admiralty Court. From Daniel’s behaviour toward them,
and from the way Ochiltree was treated before and during his trial in Dieppe, there is
no question that the French considered him to be a pirate rather than a prisoner of
war.49 As it was, it required high-level British diplomatic efforts before Ochiltree’s
extradition was arranged and he was able to return to London.50
The closing notes surrounding Lord Ochiltree’s brief but tempestuous career as a
colonist are best seen in light of the ongoing negotiations that were taking place
between the French and British surrounding events in North America and efforts to
ratify the Treaty of Susa. It is now generally accepted that Charles I was prepared to
restore Quebec and the St. Lawrence installations to the French – partly because they
had been taken after hostilities had officially ceased and partly because other aspects
of the treaty made this a worthwhile concession.51 For this territory, the main task was
to arbitrate the varying claims of the Merchant Adventurers of Canada and the French
who had been at Quebec. This was accomplished through recourse to the English
Admiralty Court and was mostly settled by the end of 1631.52 Acadia, however, was
another matter. John Reid has shown convincingly that Charles I did not immediately
abandon hope of retaining this territory nor did he want to negotiate away Sir William
Alexander’s ability to entrench Nova Scotia as a colony.53 It is here that Lord
Ochiltree enters the picture one last time and where his role in high-level strategies
regarding the region must be reconsidered. 
Reid’s assertions regarding Charles I’s ongoing intention to retain Nova Scotia up
to 1632 are convincingly based upon the continued support the king provided for
Alexander and related assurances he made to the Scottish Privy Council. That body
had belatedly decided that retaining the colony was a matter of national prestige. Any
encouragement that the king could provide for Alexander was most understandable,
as his charter was now over a decade old and because he had staked so much on the
establishment of the colony. Thus, Charles’ letters to these parties, and the
Acadiensis120
48 Guthry, “Relation”, pp. 4-6; Daniel, “Relation”; André Malapart, “La prise d’un seigneur ecossaise”,
in Felix, Voyage, pp. 13-14. See also Andrew Nicholls, “Showdown at Fort Rosemar”, The Beaver
(June/July 2004), pp. 30-4. 
49 PRO, SP, CO, 1/5, no. 41, 46.
50 There is conflicting evidence over the exact month in which he was returned. When Constance Ferrar
petitioned the Privy Council on 9 December 1629, he assumed that Ochiltree was still imprisoned in
Dieppe. Sir Isaac Wake, writing from Paris in January, stated that his complaints over the treatment
Ochiltree was receiving in prison had already led to his release. Ochiltree seems to have been in
London by late January, as he began to petition the king and the Privy Council during that month. See
PRO, SP, CO 1/5, no. 41, 46, 47 and Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of
Charles I, vol. V, (Liechtenstein, 1967) p. 164.
51 For one thing, ratification of the treaty promised the full payment of Queen Henrietta Maria’s
marriage dowry. For a full account, see Reid, “The Scots Crown and the Restitution of Port Royal”,
pp. 53-5.
52 PRO, SP, CO, 1/5, no. 16, 20, 33-6, 38, 49, 51.
53 Reid, “Scots Crown”.
14370-08 Nicholls Research  10/13/05  2:03 PM  Page 120
correspondence of his ambassadors who were working to ratify the treaty with France,
give strong indications that Nova Scotia (or Acadia as the French called it) was to be
retained.54 Lord Ochiltree was expected to play a role in strengthening this claim
because, from the time of his return from France, Ochiltree had lobbied Charles for
restitution of damages he had incurred on his recent adventures and for support to
resume his colonial venture. In his appeals to the king, he made no mention of any
subordinate status he might have had to the Alexanders and instead indicated that he
saw the retention of Nova Scotia, and his own return to the New World, as necessary
for wider British security purposes.55
Charles was evidently in agreement and took several steps to assist Ochiltree in his
ambitions. He helped, for example, to clarify Ochiltree’s status vis-à-vis Alexander
and his charter. As a mark of this, on 18 April 1630 Ochiltree’s name was listed for
the first time as one of the newly made Knights-Baronet of Nova Scotia.56 Charles
went even further. To help Ochiltree fund his new venture, the king also awarded him
a 21-year lease of “all fellones landis and houses rendring [£] 500 per annum”. As this
was an award on Scottish properties, and Ochiltree’s former creditors might present
claims of their own, Charles offered an even more crucial consideration in his
declaration: “These ar therfor to will and requyre yow to prepair a bill readie for our
signatur wheby to mak the said Lord Vchiltrie a frie denizen of this our kingdome of
England and dominions therof; with this speciall caution, that it be nowayes
prejudiciall to ws in our customes: And for your soe doeing these shalbe be your
warrand”.57 For his part, Ochiltree appears to have expended great efforts of his own
recruiting potential colonial partners among the ranks of his former neighbours in
Ulster. This is evident in a final letter that Charles wrote on Ochiltree’s behalf on 19
April 1631 to the Lords Justices of Ireland. He praised the efforts of Ochiltree, and
three planters from Ulster, who wished to start a new colony “near unto the river of
Canada, in America”. The king’s support for this could not be mistaken: “Becaus the
purpois is honrabill, and may conduce to the good of our service, Our speciall pleasur
is, that from tyme to tyme, as they or any of them shall have occasion, yow grant them
Commissions and warrants requisit for transporting thither such persones as shalbe
willing to be imployed in the plantation; and that yow licence and caus licence them,
and such as shall have ther or whatsoever fitt for there vse; ffor doeing wherof, as
these presents shalbe vnto yow a sufficient warrant, so we will accompt your care in
forthring of them as good and acceptable service done vnto ws”.58
This glowing affirmation of the king’s ongoing support buttresses the notion that
Charles was fully sincere in his stated objective of retaining Nova Scotia for the
Alexanders, and that he wanted to ensure Ochiltree’s return to the New World up until
at least April 1631. While the letter to the Lords Justices of Ireland does not specify
the exact location Ochiltree intended for the plantation, all of the rest of the
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correspondence surrounding the ongoing negotiations with the French suggests that it
would have been somewhere within the lands Alexander claimed as Nova Scotia.
Even though the French had remained firm in their demands since the beginning of
1631 that Acadia must be returned to them, Charles’ ambassadors did not actually
agree to abandon claims to the territory until early April.59 If Charles’ support for
Ochiltree, as outlined in the letter to the Lords Justices of Ireland, is to be believed,
then even in mid-April he was still keeping his options open. But, just two weeks
later, Ochiltree made the supreme political blunder of accusing the Marquis of
Hamilton of raising troops to orchestrate a coup d’état in Scotland.60
Still reeling from the loss of Buckingham three years earlier, and growing
increasingly paranoid about the loyalty of many of his subjects, Charles quickly
reversed his support for Ochiltree and immediately ordered his incarceration. It is a
rather unfortunate footnote to Ochiltree’s story that he never actually faced charges or
a trial surrounding this incident, but instead languished in prison in London
throughout the summer of 1631 until Charles finally ordered him transported to
Edinburgh. Ultimately, he would remain in prison in Blackness Castle until his release
by Oliver Cromwell’s troops in 1652.61 He died, virtually penniless, in 1659.
The rapid decline in Ochiltree’s fortunes in the spring of 1631 should not be seen
as an isolated incident that affected him alone. Instead, it should also be seen as an
aspect of the final death of William Alexander’s dreams for Nova Scotia and as the
abandonment of a emerging policy for protecting British interests in North America.
By the end of April 1631 Charles I was faced with a difficult choice. His agents had
concluded the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Lay with the French, which included the
firm French demands of the surrender of Port Royal and the abandonment of Acadia.
However, Charles had not only made supportive gestures to Alexander and political
interests in Scotland – he had also provided fulsome support for Ochiltree. Ochiltree’s
reckless charge against Hamilton, and the royal fury which this invoked, thus gave
Charles a compelling reason to allow a diplomatic reversal on Nova Scotia. Alexander
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had always argued that Port Royal was essential to the survival of the colony as it was
the only functioning settlement. This was true, and Nova Scotia was certainly
vulnerable on a number of counts. The Ochiltree settlement was, therefore, to have
been an important component in strengthening the colony. But, as the politics of the
Hamilton incident played themselves out, and as it became clear that Ochiltree would
not be returning to the New World, Charles was able to claim a balance between
diplomatic imperatives and the ambitions of the Alexanders and other supporters of
Nova Scotia.  On 10 July 1631 Charles issued a royal order demanding the surrender
of Port Royal to the French.62 The terms of the treaty were thus on their way to being
met, but Charles remained careful in his correspondence with Alexander and with the
Scottish Privy Council to affirm that the surrender of Port Royal did not mean a denial
of Alexander’s chartered territories. It amounted to the same thing, however, and
ultimately doomed this incarnation of Nova Scotia.
In the final analysis, the king’s change of heart in 1631 ought not to suggest that
he was ignorant of the potential importance of the Nova Scotia colonies nor that he
was unprepared to offer their leaders his active support. Thus, the documentary
evidence, at least in this instance, does not support the conventional view of British
Crown disinterest in colonial initiatives in North America in the early-17th century.
The new circumstances created, however, by the end of the French war, the
completion of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Lay and Ochiltree’s fall from favour
freed Charles from making specific commitments in that direction. As a result, Nova
Scotia would not become a recognized part of the British empire until 1713.
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